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NOTES
CURTAILMENT: INCREASED FTC REGULATION
OF DIRECT SALES OF NATURAL GAS
Heavy demands for natural gas plus an existing shortage
forced pipeline companies to apply to the Federal Power Com-
mission' for permission to reduce deliveries to their customers.
Louisiana Power & Light Company sought to enjoin such cur-
tailment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the in-
junction,2 and held that under section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas
Act,8 FPC curtailment orders could not apply to direct sales by
pipeline companies to ultimate consumers. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed and held that the FPC has power to au-
thorize curtailment schedules for both resale and direct sales of
natural gas under the "transportation" basis of jurisdiction
granted by Congress; and that this section of the act only pro-
hibits FPC regulation of rates of direct sales. Federal Power
Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 92 S. Ct. 1827
(1972).
Early Supreme Court cases limited the scope of state regulation
of the natural gas industry by forbidding local control of sales
of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale to consumers. 4
A 1936 report by the Federal Trade Commission 5 prompted Con-
gress to enact the Natural Gas Act in 1938 to fill this regulatory
void, and to protect consumers from exploitation by natural gas
companies.6 In passing the act, Congress intended to create a
"comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme, complementary
in its operation to those of the states and in no manner usurping
their authority" over local transactions.7 For this reason section
1 (b) was included in the act to define the extent of its applica-
tion:
1. Hereinafter cited as FPC.
2. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 456 F.2d 326
(1972).
3. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717(w) (1970).
4. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 270 U.S. 550 (1926);
Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
5. S. Doc. No. 92, pt.84A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
6. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Sun-
ray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960); Phillips Petr. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944).
7. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 520
(1947). See also, FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1
(1961); Phillips Petr. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); FPC v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331
U.S. 682 (1947).
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"The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or
any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such
transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other trans-
portation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of
natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or
to the production or gathering of natural gas."s
Through section 1 (b) Congress delegated three aspects of
the natural gas industry to FPC regulation: (1) the transpor-
tation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in inter-
state commerce for resale; and (3) those natural gas companies
engaged in such transportation or sale.9 This section was inter-
preted to exclude federal regulation of direct sales, i.e., those
sales made to ultimate consumers for industrial uses or genera-
tion of electricity. The courts reasoned that the states could
regulate such sales.10
The 1942 amendment to section 7(c)11 of the act reiterated
congressional intent to regulate transportation of natural gas,1 2
and required natural gas pipelines to acquire a certificate of
convenience and necessity from the FPC for all extensions and
constructions of their lines, whether or not the proposed route
was already being served by another pipeline. 3 Without this
certificate, pipeline extensions or construction could not be made
to the prospective purchaser, thus causing the contemplated sale
between pipeline and consumer to fail. This certification pro-
cedure under 7(c) was the only aspect of direct sales that the
FPC could regulate. 14
However, the commission used section 7 (c) to exert indirect
& 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970).
9. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507,
516 (1947).
10. FPC v. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Pan-
handle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951);
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
11. 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
12. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 468 (1950)
13. Before this amendment to § 7(c), a certificate of convenience and
necessity was only required if a pipeline company wished to extend into an
area served by an existing pipeline.
14. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 4 (1961).
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control over direct sales.15 During a certification investigation,
the FPC began to consider such criteria as the impact on ser-
vice to present customers, 1 the effect of sale price on natural
gas rates in the gas field, and the end use of the gas.17 If these
facts appeared to be adverse to the public interest, the FPC
refused a certificate of convenience and necessity, thereby pre-
venting the sale. In FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp.,18 the Supreme Court limited the commission's authority
over direct sales in certification proceedings to the exercise of a
veto power over a proposed extension or construction. Even
though the decision noted that the commission had no con-
tinuous control over direct sales, it was criticized for granting
the FPC too much power.19
In the instant case, the issue was whether the FPC had
authority to modify a certificate of convenience and necessity
after it was granted in a direct sale.20 The district court found
any interference with direct sales to be a collateral effect of
the curtailment and not an attempt by the FPC to exert juris-
diction over such contracts.21 The Fifth Circuit reversed, re-
lying on Transco in holding that the commission's authority
over direct sales ended with certification. The Supreme Court
upheld the district court, finding authority to allow the cur-
tailment under the transportation basis of authority of section
1 (b). Curtailment of natural gas deliveries amounted to FPC
regulation of the "transportation" of natural gas. 22 Thus the
15. Comment, 1 HOUSTON L. REV. 29, 41 (1963): "Where non-jurisdictional
transactions are involved, such as direct industrial sales or leasehold sales,
the Federal Power Commission exercises an effective indirect control in
that it can review the non-jurisdictional transaction before permitting the
gas to move in interstate commerce."
16. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 360 U.S. 378 (1959); Pan-
handle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 891 (1956).
17. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
18. Id. [Hereinafter cited as Transco.]
19. Armour & Flittie, The Natural Gas Act Experience-A Studyin
ReguZatory Aggression and Congressional Failure to Control the Legislative
Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448 (1965); Note, 75 HARV. L. Riv. 239 (1961); Note, 21
LA. L. Rsv. 790 (1961).
20. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 456 F.2d
326, 335 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 332 F.
Supp. 692, 698 (W.D. La. 1971).
22. F!C v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 92 S.Ct. 1827, 1837 (1972):
"[T]he prohibtion of the proviso of § 1(b) withheld from FPC only rate set-
ting authority with respect to direct sales. Curtailment regulations are not
rate setting regulations but regulations of the 'transportation' of natural gas
and thus within FPC jurisdiction under the opening sentence of § 1(b) that
'The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce .... "
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section applied to any movement of gas, whether for resale or
direct sale.
In order to reach the decision, the Court looked to the pur-
pose of the act to protect consumers;28 congressional desire for
a comprehensive regulatory scheme with no gaps in regulation; 24
and the consumer's inability to bear the full brunt of the cur-
tailment,25 particularly when many direct customers had other
fuel sources available.26
The legislative history of the Natural Gas Act supports the
Court's holding that the section 1 (b) exclusion forbids only
FPC regulation of direct sale rates.27 FPC v. East Ohio Gas
Co. had already recognized transportation as an important basis
for FPC regulation; 28 and in Panhand le Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. Public Service Commission the Court noted that curtailment
plans would fall under FPC "transportation" jurisdiction rather
than "sales. '29 Further, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, it was
held to be an interference with commerce for the states to cur-
tail interstate gas deliveries; s ° and in the Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases it was stated that the commission's important and
difficult responsibilities required that the agency be upheld with-
out compelling evidence of contrary congressional intent.3 1 By
distinguishing Transco3 2 as applying FPC veto power under
23. Id. at 1833.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1834: "These resale consumers could be curtailed by as
much as 560,000 Mcf [million cubic feet] on cold days without dire conse-
quences, but burdening them with the full curtailment volume would de-
prive them of up to 1,500,000 Mcf."
26. Id.
27. The language of § 1(b) tends to indicate that any regulation of direct
sales was excluded; yet early versions of the act indicate an attempt to pro-
hibit only regulation of rates. E.g., H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936):
"ProiAded, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Com-
mission to fix rates or charges for the sale of natural gas distributed locally
in low-pressure mains or for the sale of natural gas for industrial use
only."; H.R. 12680, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. REp. No. 709, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937). See also, FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 92 S. Ct.
1827, 1838 (1972); Note, 44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956).
28. 338 U.S. 464, 473 (1950).
29. 332 U.S. 507, 523 (1947): "[Tlhe matter of interrupting service is one
largely related . . . to transportation and thus within the jurisdiction of
the Federal Power Commission to control, in accommodation of any con-
flicting interests among various states." See also, FPC v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 92 S. Ct. 1827, 1839 (1972).
30. 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
31. 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968): "We are, in the absence of compelling evi-
dence that such was Congress' intention, unwilling to prohibit administrative
action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes."
32. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 92 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1972).
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section 7, the Supreme Court could disregard that decision here,
where the FPC ordered curtailments to prevent discrimination
under section 4 of the act.88
In deciding this case the Court realized that a national prob-
lem existed that had to be solved to prevent disruption in the
natural gas industry, and to protect the public. The FPC was
properly acting under its general grant of authority in the ab-
sence of more recent congressional action. 4 This case should
put other direct sale purchasers of gas for "inferior" 85 uses on
notice that similar plans could be formulated by the FPC to
protect the consuming public as the natural gas crisis becomes
critical.
Ronald R. Gonzales
PROBABLE CAUSE: VERACITY OF UNDERLYING FACTS
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana.' A
search warrant, whereby the crucial evidence was obtained, was
issued largely on the basis of statements made by a confidential
informer which the affiant, a police officer, believed in good
faith to be true. The district court sustained a motion to sup-
press2 after an evidentiary hearing showed that the informer
had lied as to the facts contained in the supporting affidavit. The
Louisiana supreme court granted writs to review the sustaining
of the motion to suppress. Held, the truthfulness of the facts
set out in an affidavit supporting a search warrant may not later
be attacked at a hearing on a motion to suppress. State v. An-
selnmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1971).
The question of whether the underlying facts supporting a
finding of probable cause are actually true is a different one
33. 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1970).
34. See generally Fuch, The New Administrative State: Judicial Sanction
for Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 216, 244 (1969): "If actual abuse at the administrative level should take
place, it would probably be checked by judicial reversal or new legislation;
and action by the legislature to overcome overbold decisions by agencies or
courts in the construction of statutes is available as well."
35. "Inferior" use is burning natural gas for Industrial purposes where
more abundant energy sources could be substituted. FPC v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 8 (1961).
1. LA. R.S. 40:971 (3)(c) (Supp. 1970): "It is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance...."
2. IA. CODs CRam. P. art. 703A.
1973]
